DataPacts

Export Controls (ITAR, EAR, CUI) and Licensing Technical Data to AI Buyers

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At a glance

US export controls decide whether technical data in a company's archive may be licensed to an AI buyer and who at that buyer may see it: the ITAR covers technical data for defense articles, the EAR covers controlled dual-use technology and source code, and the CUI program covers information created or held for a federal agency.

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AI buyers ask for engineering, design and process records, and both export regimes count a release to a foreign person inside the US as an export, so the export layer of AI training data licensing reaches the buyer's own staff and vendors.

The rules below are cited as in force on eCFR as of 2026-11-17; the classification of any specific file is not covered.

Every rule and buyer statement on this page carries its source and date; the methodology page sets out how we source, date and check every figure.

Three Federal Regimes That Reach Technical Data in an AI Data License

Three sets of federal rules reach technical data in an AI data license, and the table lists the provisions this page relies on, each with its citation and status as of 2026-11-17.

Regime Provision What it says for a data seller Status as of 2026-11-17 Source
ITAR 22 CFR 120.33(a)(1) technical data includes blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions or documentation required for defense articles in force ecfr.gov
ITAR 22 CFR 120.50(a)(2) releasing or transferring technical data to a foreign person in the US is an export in force ecfr.gov
ITAR 22 CFR 120.54(a)(5) end-to-end encrypted sending or storing of unclassified technical data at FIPS 140-2 or AES-128 strength, not in proscribed countries, is not an export in force ecfr.gov
EAR 15 CFR 734.7 published information and published datasets are not subject to the EAR in force ecfr.gov
EAR 15 CFR 734.13 release of controlled technology or source code to a foreign person in the US is a deemed export; 2016 text (81 FR 35603) in force ecfr.gov
EAR 15 CFR 734.13(b) a deemed export goes to the foreign person's most recent country of citizenship or permanent residency in force ecfr.gov
EAR 15 CFR 734.18(a)(5) end-to-end encrypted sending or storing of unclassified technology, not stored in Country Group D:5, is not an export in force ecfr.gov
CUI 32 CFR 2002.4(h) CUI is information the Government creates or possesses, or an entity creates or possesses for the Government, needing safeguarding or dissemination controls in force ecfr.gov
CUI 32 CFR 2002.4(h) information not from or for an executive-branch agency is excluded, so privately created company data is not CUI in force ecfr.gov

The rules stack, so one archive can hold ITAR drawings, EAR technology and CUI side by side, and each file is checked against all three.

ITAR Technical Data: Drawings and Documentation for Defense Articles

Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, technical data includes blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions and documentation required for defense articles (22 CFR 120.33(a)(1)), which is the kind of material an engineering archive offered to an AI buyer often holds.

Releasing or transferring such data to a foreign person in the US is an export (22 CFR 120.50(a)(2)), so defense-related engineering data cannot go to foreign persons, including an AI buyer's foreign staff or offshore annotators, without authorization.

Which authorization applies and how it is obtained is not described on this page. The sellers most likely to hold such records are manufacturing, engineering and semiconductor companies, and the drawings arrive in the form of CAD and engineering files as AI training data.

EAR Technology and Source Code: Published Versus Unpublished Records

The Export Administration Regulations draw their main line for data sellers between published information, which 15 CFR 734.7 places outside the EAR, and controlled technology or source code, whose release to a foreign person is a deemed export under 15 CFR 734.13.

Section 734.13 in its 2016 form (81 FR 35603) treats the release of controlled technology or source code to a foreign person in the US as a deemed export, and it is in force as of 2026-11-17. Whether a given record is controlled depends on a classification that this page does not record, and the conditions under which a record counts as published are likewise not set out here, so a seller treats the line as a question to put to its own classification, not as an answer.

Why Buyers' Requests for Unpublished Run and Design Records Meet the EAR

AI buyers ask for unpublished engineering records by name, which places their requests on the controlled side of the EAR's published-information line unless the seller's own classification shows otherwise. Two statements by buyers show the pattern, each a claim by the buyer and not a finding of this page:

  • Mercor states that its Semiconductor & Materials Company listing asks for run or build records the company owns, with recipe or process settings linked to measured performance, 1,000+ runs, and "Data that hasn't been published", and that published papers and datasheets are not a fit (checked 2026-11-09).
  • Mercor states that its Hardware Engineering Company listing asks for full multi-part assemblies in native CAD with feature trees that the company owns (checked 2026-11-09).

Handshake AI names "Hardware & engineering" among its industries (checked 2026-11-09). Semiconductor companies licensing process data face the same question once that industry page is published.

Deemed Exports: When a Buyer's Foreign Annotators or Staff Receive the Data

Both export regimes count a release of controlled data to a foreign person inside the United States as an export, so handing an archive to an AI buyer is only the first transfer; every person at the buyer or its vendors who opens the files is a second question.

The ITAR rule is 22 CFR 120.50(a)(2) and the EAR rule is 15 CFR 734.13. Under 15 CFR 734.13(b) the deemed export goes to the foreign person's most recent country of citizenship or permanent residency, so the person's nationality, not the buyer's address, decides the destination.

Buyers with global annotator workforces, and offshore or foreign annotators, are the case in point. What counts as a foreign person and as a release is not defined here, and releases abroad to third-country nationals are not covered.

A buyer linked to China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia or Venezuela raises a separate federal rule for bulk US sensitive personal data, 28 CFR Part 202, effective 2025-04-08, which reaches personal data even when it is de-identified. That rule has its own page on the DOJ rule on selling data to foreign AI buyers.

Questions a Seller Puts to a Buyer About Who Will See Controlled Data

A seller holding possibly controlled records asks the buyer in writing who will receive, view or annotate them before any file leaves the company. The questions are:

  • which entities and vendors receive the data;
  • where annotators and reviewers sit, and which citizenships or permanent residencies they hold, as far as the buyer will state them;
  • whether the buyer's terms exclude export-controlled data, as micro1's s.5.7(g) does;
  • how the data is stored and sent.

The answers belong in the buyer review the seller runs anyway, which is part of what sellers should check about an AI buyer, and they do not by themselves clear any release.

Encrypted Transfer and Storage: What the Carve-Outs Cover and What They Do Not

Sending or storing controlled data under end-to-end encryption is not an export under either regime when the conditions are met, but the carve-outs cover the encrypted copy, not a person who reads the decrypted files.

The ITAR carve-out, 22 CFR 120.54(a)(5), applies to unclassified technical data secured by end-to-end encryption at FIPS 140-2 or AES-128 strength and not sent to or stored in proscribed countries. The EAR carve-out, 15 CFR 734.18(a)(5), applies to end-to-end encrypted unclassified technology that is not stored in Country Group D:5.

A training buyer has to decrypt to train or annotate, so the release question from the deemed-export section returns at that point, and the cloud region and the list of logins come first.

Encryption is one part of access and encryption during an AI data sale, and it is never a substitute for the screening above.

Controlled Unclassified Information: Data Created or Held for a Government Agency

Controlled unclassified information is information the Government creates or possesses, or that an entity creates or possesses for the Government, that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls (32 CFR 2002.4(h)).

For a contractor, government-originated information held under a contract stays out of an AI data license unless the controls permit its release, while data the company created privately and not for an agency is not CUI.

The line therefore runs by origin and purpose, not by file type. Contract clauses that set how a contractor safeguards such information, and CUI categories and markings, are not described here. Public-sector holders and their records appear among governments and open data as training data sources.

How AI Buyers' License Terms Treat Export-Controlled Information

At least one AI buyer excludes the category in its own contract: micro1's Data License Master Terms s.5.7(g) list export-controlled, classified or ITAR/EAR-restricted information among the excluded data, unless the Order Form provides otherwise (terms last updated 2026-11-12, re-read 2026-11-16).

The same clause excludes PHI and biometric data, unlawful, obscene and harmful material, payment card or financial account data and children's data, and the licensor remediates at no cost to the licensee.

An exclusion in a buyer's terms moves the classification work and its risk to the seller; it does not authorize a release. No other buyer is said to have or lack such a clause. The micro1 Data License Master Terms clause by clause page sets s.5.7 in context.

Benefits, Risks, Downsides and Alternatives When an Archive Holds Controlled Data, Including Not Licensing

An engineering or research archive can still be licensed when its controlled parts are found and handled first, and leaving those parts out, or not licensing at all, remain valid choices.

Benefits

  • Published information sits outside the EAR (15 CFR 734.7).
  • Privately created data that is not for an agency is not CUI (32 CFR 2002.4(h)).
  • Buyer terms that exclude the category give both sides a stated line.

Risks

  • A release to a foreign person in the US is an export under both regimes.
  • Buyers ask for unpublished records by name.
  • A buyer's exclusion clause leaves the classification with the seller, one of several kinds of company data that cannot be licensed for AI training.

Downsides

  • File-by-file screening of drawings, code and run records comes before scoping.
  • The buyer may not answer questions about annotator location.
  • Encryption covers transit and storage, not people.

Alternatives

  • License only published or clearly uncontrolled records.
  • License a de-scoped set without defense, controlled or government-related projects.
  • Restrict access to named persons by contract.
  • Wait for the company's own classification.
  • Not licensing at all.

The full range is set out in alternatives to selling data to AI labs, including not selling.

Beyond Export Controls: Foreign Buyers, Trade Secrets and the Seller Steps

Export controls are one federal layer on a training data deal, alongside copyright, privacy, trade-secret and foreign-buyer rules. The page on United States AI training data law sets them side by side.

How This Page Is Sourced and Dated

Every rule here cites the current eCFR text of 22 CFR Part 120, 15 CFR Part 734 or 32 CFR Part 2002, and every buyer term is the buyer's own statement with the date it was read.

The methodology page explains how we source and date every rule. This page is general information about US export controls, not legal advice or an export classification for any file, buyer or deal.

Frequently Asked Questions

What data is subject to export control?

Technical data for defense articles under the ITAR (22 CFR 120.33(a)(1)) and controlled technology or source code under the EAR (15 CFR 734.13). Published information is outside the EAR (734.7).

What is ITAR regulated data?

Blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions or documentation required for defense articles. Releasing them to a foreign person in the US is an export (120.50(a)(2)).

Is giving data to a foreign annotator in the US an export?

Yes, if the data is controlled. ITAR 120.50(a)(2) and EAR 734.13 treat release to a foreign person inside the US as an export, under the EAR to the person's most recent country of citizenship or permanent residency.

Is published data subject to the EAR?

No. 15 CFR 734.7 places published information outside the EAR, though unpublished records may still be controlled.